After being taken away by La Mong (General of Eastern Ngo) Kinh Chau, an important land in the Three Kingdoms, Guan Yu was on the same path. In early 220, Guan Yu was captured and executed by the Dong Ngo army while on the way to Lam Thu.
The loss of Kinh Chau and the sudden death of Guan Yu became turning points on the political chessboard of the Three Kingdoms, especially causing many variables in the situation of Shu Han.
By losing Kinh Chau, Quan Vu not only caused the Shu Han faction to suffer heavy losses in force but also caused himself and his son to lose their lives. Furthermore, the defeat and departure of Guan Yu made Zhuge Liang’s strategy outlined in Long Trung no longer feasible. After that, because he was in a hurry to avenge Guan Yu, Truong Phi beat his generals and was eventually assassinated by two subordinate generals, Pham Cuong and Truong Dat, in 221.
Guan Yu was captured and executed by the Eastern Wu army in early 220.
In the same year, on Liu Bei’s side, because he wanted to take revenge on Guan Yu and reclaim Kinh Chau, he mobilized a large army to attack Dong Ngo without thinking about the pros and cons, ignoring many advice from those around him. As a result, Liu Bei and the Shu Han army were heavily defeated by Luc Ton (general Dong Ngo) at Di Lang around August 222. In this battle, many martial generals died and Shu Han also suffered heavy losses, while Liu Bei had to flee back to Bach De citadel.
According to historical records, the defeat at Di Lang was a fatal blow to Liu Bei, although he later reconciled with Dong Ngo. Furthermore, because it was impossible to retake important lands like Kinh Chau, the “Long Trung countermeasure” strategy proposed by Zhuge Liang was also difficult to implement. On the other hand, it was even more difficult for Shu Han to attack Cao Wei to restore the Han dynasty. Due to too much worry and sadness, Liu Bei’s health was seriously affected and the emperor eventually fell seriously ill and died in Bach De citadel in 223.
Liu Bei was eager to avenge Guan Yu and take back Jingzhou, so he was ultimately defeated at Di Lang, causing great losses to Shu Han.
After Liu Bei’s heavy defeat at Di Lang, Shu Han’s strength seriously declined, becoming “the weakest” among the three countries of Cao Wei, Shu Han and Eastern Wu.
According to common sense, with this situation, this is the best time for Cao Wei to destroy Shu Han. Cao Pi, Cao Cao’s son, was then the emperor of Cao Wei, so he took this rare opportunity to lead a large army to attack Shu Han. However, The strange thing is that Cao Phi “remained motionless”, completely not taking advantage of this opportunity to destroy Shu Han.
Many people under Cao Pi did not understand why this emperor missed such a good opportunity. Even a talented, clever and scheming person like Sima Yi took 22 years to know the reason behind Cao Pi’s decision.
What is that?
22 years later, Sima Yi understood Cao Pi’s decision
Cao Pi made a surprising decision after Shu Han failed miserably at Di Lang.
Many people believe that the reason Cao Pi did not take the opportunity to attack Shu Han but sent troops to attack Dong Ngo was mainly because Shu Han was too weak and had lost its threat to Cao Wei. Meanwhile, what Cao Pi did not expect was that Sun Quan, the monarch of Eastern Wu, initially advocated declaring himself to Cao Wei, accepting the title of King of Wu, but then seceded in 222.
Furthermore, after the battle of Di Lang, Dong Ngo’s strength skyrocketed. Perhaps Cao Pi thought that Dong Ngo was the real force that threatened Cao Wei’s fledgling government at that time, so he turned to attack this country.
Fighting Shu Han is not easy
After the battle of Di Lang, Shu Han was indeed seriously weakened, but this did not mean that the country did not have a chance to come back. The reason Wei Wen Emperor Cao Pi decided not to attack Shu Han was because He realized that Cao Wei really did not have the ability to do this.
Cao Pi knew clearly that although Shu Han was weak, the terrain of Shu Han, especially Han China, was very complicated. This place is easy to defend and difficult to attack, is not suitable for carrying out a large-scale attack. Therefore, Cao Pi believed that even if he could destroy Shu Han, he and Cao Wei would have to pay a heavy price.
Vuong Binh was a general who achieved many victories for Shu Han. In particular, he led the army that blocked the attack of Cao Wei’s army in 244.
It was not until 22 years later that Sima Yi understood Cao Pi’s thoughts. Specifically, year 244, Cao Shuang, a powerful minister of Cao Wei, commanded 100,000 troops from Lekou to attack Hanzhong, thereby taking the opportunity to destroy Shu Han. Unfortunately, Cao Sang not only failed to do this, but was also intercepted by the Shu army (at that time less than 30,000 people) led by Wang Ping in the middle of the mountains of Hanzhong.
When reinforcements arrived from Chengdu, Shu Han’s great army cut off the Wei army’s line of attack. At the same time, epidemics occurred in De Giang and Quan Trung, leaving the Wei army without enough food and provisions. Cao Shuang and the Wei army could not resist so they had to retreat.
After 22 years, Sima Yi finally understood Cao Pi’s unusual decision not to attack Shu Han.
After this battle, the Wei army suffered heavy losses, and Cao Shuang’s reputation and prestige were also greatly affected. It was the losses in the attack on Shu Han that contributed to Cao Shuang’s final defeat at the hands of Sima Yi in 249, when the politician and military leader launched the transformation of Cao Binh mausoleum famous in history.
Obviously, after 22 years, an intelligent and patient person like Sima Yi realized how wise Cao Pi was in his decision not to attack Shu Han after Liu Bei was defeated at Di Lang. Cao Wei’s reckless attack on Shu Han at that time was not a waste of effort. Standing in the position of an emperor who had just ascended the throne with an unstable country situation, Cao Pi’s decision was completely correct.
Article reference source: Sohu, 163, Baidu